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Abstract 
 
The present study discusses findings that replicate and extend the original work of 
Burns and Vollmeyer (2002), which showed that performance in problem solving 
tasks was more accurate when people were engaged in a non-specific goal than in 
a specific goal. The main innovation here was to examine the goal specificity 
effect under both observation-based and conventional action-based learning 
conditions. The findings show that goal specificity affects the accuracy of problem 
solving in the same way, both when the learning stage of the task is observation-
based and when it is action-based. Additionally, the findings show that, when 
instructions do not promote goal specificity, observation-based problem solving is 
as effective as action-based problem solving. 
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Observation Can Be as Effective as Action in Problem Solving 
1. Introduction 
Case 1. A food services manager requires, for his food products, a new 
warming display cabinet that can maintain a more even temperature across the shelf 
surfaces. The manager must first watch the engineer install and demonstrate the new 
multi-functioning thermal control system, based only on the precise temperature at 
which to display their food, and must then restart and control the system himself.  
Case 2. A medical research unit that is conducting a field experiment requests 
a blood analyzing instrument that requires a specialized miniature air heater that must 
reach 380°F within 3.5 seconds. A member of the research unit is assigned to examine 
and learn to use the new custom-built air heater, according to the strict specifications 
that are outlined.  
 These cases have in common a precise goal that involves controlling a 
complex dynamic control system (hereafter CDCS) (i.e., thermal control system, 
blood analyzing instrument) by adhering to specific criteria (i.e., temperature 
regulation). The critical distinction between these cases is that, in the former case, 
learning to control the system takes place indirectly through observation, whereas in 
the latter the individual must learn to control the system by interacting with it. This 
difference raises the question whether the execution of the specific goal is more 
accurate after learning in Case 2, in which acquisition of knowledge is an interactive 
activity, compared to Case 1, in which knowledge acquisition occurs indirectly 
through observation. It also raises the question whether learning to control a CDCS to 
specific criteria benefits an overall understanding of the system, in comparison to 
learning that takes place with no specific outcome set out.  
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These questions have been separately addressed in studies of CDCS in 
problem solving research. Recent evidence (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Vollmeyer, 
Burns, & Holyoak, 1996) has shown that, when presented with a specific goal (SG) 
instruction—that is, when problem solvers are required to learn about a system whilst 
also controlling it to a specific criterion—they later show decrements in their 
knowledge of the underlying structure of the system and in their ability to control the 
system to criteria other than those they were trained on, compared with when they are 
given a non-specific goal (NSG): i.e., they simply learn about the system they are 
presented with. Decrements in control performance have also been reported when 
learning about the control task is observation-based (i.e., acquiring knowledge 
indirectly) compared to when it is procedural-based (i.e., acquiring knowledge 
directly) (Berry, 1991; Lee, 1995). Although the effects of goal specificity and 
learning phase (i.e., observation-based, procedural-based) on problem solving have 
been examined using the same paradigm (i.e., CDCS), the two sets of findings remain 
independent of each other. The present study addresses this by examining whether 
action is a necessary component in the acquisition of skilled knowledge in a complex 
dynamic control task, as some theorists (e.g., Berry, 1991) have argued. If it is the 
case that procedural-based learning, rather than the goal the problem solver 
undertakes, is necessary for skill learning to take place, then decrements in problem 
solving ability, evidenced as control performance, should be found when learning of a 
CDCS is observation-based, regardless of the specificity of the goal in which the 
learner is engaged.  
1.1. Complex Dynamic Control Tasks (CDCTs) 
CDCTs have been a popular task environment for examining motivational and 
affective processes in complex decision making (Earley, Connolly, & Ekegren, 1989; 
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Locke & Latham, 2002; Vancouver, 1997), skill learning in naturalistic decision 
making (Brehmer, 1992; Kerstholt, 1996; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001), 
memory and attentional processes in problem solving (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; 
Miller, Lehman, & Koedinger, 1999; Vollmeyer et al., 1996), and implicit learning 
(Berry, 1991; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 1998). The reason for 
this popularity is that tasks using CDCS are dynamic learning environments. Rarely is 
it the case that a decision or plan that is made in the real world is isolated from prior 
decisions or plans (Funke, 2001), and in this sense CDCTs provide a good model of 
actual situations in the world (Brehmer, 1992; Funke, 2001). This makes them ideal 
for studying the acquisition and transfer of skill-based knowledge in a variety of 
complex interactive environments (Campbell, 1988; Cañas, Quesada, Antoli, & 
Fajardo, 2003; Funke, 2001).  
To illustrate, a typical CDCT includes several inputs (e.g., concentration levels 
of salt, carbon, and lime) that are connected via a complex causal structure or rule to 
several outputs (e.g., Chlorine concentration, Oxygenation levels, Temperature) (See 
Figure 1). The CDCS presented in Figure 1 is taken from Burns and Vollmeyer’s 
(2002) task, which was based on a water purification plant and will be used in the 
present study.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The process by which a problem solver learns about the system is revealed by 
the values of the inputs that they change and the strategy that they adopt (e.g., vary all 
inputs at once, vary one input on each trial, vary one input by one unit on each trial). 
Through this process, problem solvers acquire knowledge about the underlying 
structure of the system. They do this by monitoring the continuous feedback that they 
receive on the output variables that change as a result of the interventions that they 
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perform on the inputs. That is, by manipulating the input values, problem solvers can 
then track the effects on the outputs, which enables them to reason from cause (input 
changes) to effect (output changes), via acquisition of the causal structure or the rule 
that relates inputs and outputs. In Burns and Vollmeyer’s example, the input-output 
relations are linear, but with a constant value added to each input-output connection. 
To examine problem solvers’ knowledge of the system, two types of measures 
are used. Usually, the difference between the learning phase and the test phase of a 
CDCT is that, in the latter, problem solvers are required to control the system to a 
criterion. In the learning phase, the interventions on the system are designed to 
discover the underlying structure of the system, whereas the test phase involves 
making critical interventions that will achieve and maintain specific output values 
(i.e., the specific criterion) on each trial. Thus problem solvers are able to demonstrate 
their understanding of the CDCS by applying this knowledge to manipulate the 
system for the purposes of reaching a specific goal. In addition to this measure, which 
is referred to as the indirect measure (Berry & Broadbent, 1987), direct measures of 
knowledge examine the accuracy of problem solvers’ understanding of the causal 
structure or rule that underlies the system.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
This involves reporting the input-output connections (see Figure 2) (e.g., 
Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Vollmeyer et al., 1996), or the underlying rule that relates 
input to output (Lee, 1995; Lee & Vakoch, 1996), or predicting the output value based 
on specific input states of the system (Berry & Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Buchner, 
Funke, & Berry, 1995; Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Marescaux, Luc, & Karnas, 1989).   
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1.2. Procedural-based vs. Declarative-based Inductive Knowledge  
Some researchers (Berry & Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Dienes & Fahey, 1995, 
1998; Marescaux et al., 1989) have speculated that the knowledge acquired in 
dynamic control tasks is incidental. That is, learning is non-strategic, and that 
knowledge is acquired through direct interaction with a CDCT, and repeated exposure 
to it, which leads to the development of highly specialized specific operations (i.e., 
manipulating specific inputs to attain particular outputs). The proceduralization of 
these operations is identified by their being efficiently executed without concurrent 
conscious awareness of how they come about, and their inaccessibility to conscious 
control. Dissociation, as evidenced by good performance on indirect measures and 
poor performance on direct measures, support the claim that the knowledge gained in 
control tasks is procedural, and inaccessible to conscious awareness (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Lee, 1995; Lee & Vakoch, 1996). Along with dissociations, 
implicit learning theorists have shown that procedural knowledge fails to generalize 
beyond CDCTs that are perceptually and structurally similar to the original CDCT on 
which problems solvers were trained (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Dienes & Berry, 
1997; Sun, Merrill, & Peterson, 2001).  
Thus, Berry (Berry, 1991; Berry & Broadbent, 1987, 1988) and others (Lee, 
1995; Lee & Vakoch, 1996; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989; Sun et al., 
2001) describe control tasks as proceduralized tasks, because knowledge acquisition 
and application is incidental, and is neither regulated nor modulated by top-down 
declarative-based knowledge. This position is empirically supported by Berry’s 
(1991) study in which, in a series of experiments, participants were presented with 
observation-based learning trials (i.e., participants were presented with the learning 
trials of other participants who had already taken part in the control task), and were 
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tested under procedural-based conditions, (i.e., they were required to control the 
system to criterion through direct interaction). By so doing, Berry examined the 
potential conflicts that result during the test phase from declarative processes invoked 
by intentional examination of the learning environment through observation, and from 
procedural processes invoked by direct interaction with the control system. Berry 
reasoned that the learning and test phases would engage incongruent processes, and 
that there would be a failure to apply declarative knowledge of the system acquired 
during learning in order to later control it in the test phase. Consistent with this, the 
control performance of observation-based learners was impaired compared to that of 
procedural-based learners. Berry concluded that action is a necessary component of 
learning in a control task, and that, for maximal control performance, decision-making 
must be tied to action early in the learning process. The distinction between 
procedural-based and declarative-based learning has since been reported in a variety 
of CDCTs (e.g., Buchner et al., 1995; Lee, 1995; Lee & Vakoch, 1996).  
In summary, the evidence from studies examining procedural-based learning 
in control tasks suggests that the transferability of the knowledge is dependent on the 
type of learning phase in which knowledge acquisition takes place (i.e. observation-
based, procedural-based), and the properties of task that knowledge is being applied to 
(i.e. the perceptual and structural similarity to the training task). By focusing on 
deliberate strategies to learn about and control a CDCS (i.e., through observation-
based learning), the incidental procedural processes that would typically be invoked 
are disrupted, and the added cognitive effort that is incurred produces poorer control 
performance. Thus, for successful transfer to take place, knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge application require procedural based processing. 
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1.3. Goal-specificity 
CDCTs have also been used to examine the presence of skilled rule learning 
and hypothesis-testing behavior (Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Sweller, 1988; Vollmeyer 
et al., 1996). Expertise in CDCTs is identified by the ability to call to mind 
appropriate schemas (i.e., structures of knowledge that allow the expert to recognize a 
problem state as belonging to a particular category of problem states that typically 
require a specialized operation), which are developed from past experiences that can 
be transferred across domains (e.g., Trumpower, Goldsmith, & Guynn, 2004). Sweller 
(1988) claimed that achieving expertise in problem solving is dependent on the goal-
directedness or specificity of the goal in which the solver is engaged. When goal 
directed, the solver is focused on achieving a particular outcome through means-end 
analysis (a method of reducing the distance between the current position in the 
problem and the end state), and is unable to develop a deep understanding of the task. 
This process of means-end analysis interferes with the uptake of relevant knowledge 
through hypothesis testing, because during learning the solver is concerned only with 
serving the immediate demands of a specific goal (SG) (Sweller, 1988). 
Consequently, solvers are able to solve the problem according to the specific goal 
they are set, but they have poor knowledge of the general structure of that problem. 
By removing the goal-directed property of the CDCT, schema-based knowledge is 
promoted. This is achieved by presenting non-specific goal (NSG) instructions that 
are characterized as constraint free. This type of instruction is not goalless, because it 
encourages exploration of the problem, and places responsibility on the problem 
solver to determine the relevant properties of the CDCT. In contrast, SG instructions 
are constraint orientated. Typically, they require the solution of specific outcomes, 
 11
and therefore problem solvers are concerned with the particular operations that must 
be executed to achieve those outcomes. 
The effects of goal specificity on problem solving ability were first reported 
by Sweller (Sweller & Levine, 1982; Sweller, Mawer, & Ward, 1983) and have since 
been replicated (e.g., Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Geddes & Stevenson, 1997; Miller et 
al., 1999; Owen & Sweller, 1985; Sweller, 1988; Vollmeyer et al., 1996). Typically, 
the findings show that, when provided with an NSG instruction, problem solvers 
showed better performance on direct and indirect measures than SG instructed 
problem solvers, and were able to transfer their knowledge across a variety of 
contexts. 
Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) offer an alternative to Sweller’s (1988) Cognitive 
Load theory of the goal specificity effect. Rather than relating the effects of goal 
specificity to different demands of cognitive load, the Dual Space hypothesis (Klahr 
& Dunbar, 1988; Simon & Lea, 1974) describes the goal specificity effect in terms of 
the problem solver’s focus of attention in the problem solving environment. Burns and 
Vollemeyer claim that a problem can be deconstructed into spaces: the rule space, 
which determines the relevant relationship between inputs and outputs; and the 
instance space, which includes examples of the rule being applied. Under SG 
instructions, the instance space is relevant because it is integral to the goal: that is, the 
solver’s attention is focused primarily on achieving a particular instantiation of the 
rule, and not on discovering the rule itself. Under NSG instructions, because searching 
through the problem is unconstrained, both rule and instance spaces are relevant. 
Attention is distributed across all relevant properties of the task, because no one 
instantiation of the rule is more important that any other. In turn, searching through 
the rule space encourages hypothesis testing, which leads to a richer understanding of 
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the underlying structure of the problem (e.g., Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Geddes & 
Stevenson, 1997; Renkl, 1997; Trumpower et al., 2004; Vollmeyer et al., 1996).  
 In summary, there is strong empirical evidence that during learning knowledge 
acquired under SG instructions is only relevant for those problems that follow the 
same goal structure as training, whereas knowledge gained under NSG instructions is 
transferable and so control performance generalizes across different set goals. 
Sweller’s (1988) theory claims that the greater expenditure of cognitive effort 
incurred under SG instructions helps to guide the problem solver to the problem goal, 
but not to a deep understanding of the problem. This position differs somewhat from 
the Dual Space account, which claims that SG instructions focus attention towards 
specific states of the system, but away from learning about the underlying structure 
that relates inputs to outputs. The superficial knowledge that is acquired during SG 
instructions is in contrast with the extensive knowledge that is acquired during NSG 
instruction, which, for both theories, encourages hypothesis testing, and which both 
agree is necessary in the acquisition and application of relevant knowledge in CDCTs.
  
 
2. The Present Study 
 
 The claims made by learning theorists studying differences between 
procedural and declarative processing in CDCTs conflict with those made by theorists 
concerned with the effects of goal specificity on skill learning. The former approach 
to studying CDCTs suggests that the learning processes that underlie skill acquisition 
are bottom-up and unavailable for conscious inspection (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 
1988; Dienes & Berry, 1997). The latter approach claims that top-down processes, 
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such as hypothesis testing behavior, can be skill-based, and that control tasks help 
identify factors like goal specificity, that mitigate this kind of behavior (e.g., Burns & 
Vollmeyer, 2002; Sweller, 1988).  
The principal objective of the present study was to compare the effects on 
control performance of a dynamic control task when learning is observation-based 
with the effects when it is procedural-based; and to establish whether this, rather than 
the goal specificity of the instructions, impairs problem solving ability. To examine 
this, the present study used Burns and Vollmeyer’s (2002) water-tank system, and 
included four conditions: two in which the instructions presented in the learning phase 
of the control task were SG (SG-action, SG-observe), and two in which NSG 
instructions were presented (NSG-action, NSG-observe). If procedural processes are 
necessary to accurately control CDCTs, then performance on indirect measures for 
both observation-based conditions should be inferior to that of both procedural-based 
conditions. If, however, hypothesis testing is a necessary component in the acquisition 
of knowledge in CDCTs, then, regardless of the learning phase (i.e., observation-
based, procedural-based), SG learning should produce poorer performance on direct 
and indirect measures than NSG learning; because SG prevents hypothesis testing 
behavior, which is critical in the uptake of relevant knowledge in CDCTs. 
 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty-four students from University College London volunteered to take part 
in the experiment, and were paid £4 for their participation. Because participants in the 
observation-based learning conditions were yoked to a participant from the action-
based learning conditions, the action-based conditions were run first. Participants 
were randomly allocated to one of two conditions (NSG-action, SG-action) and, when 
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these conditions were run, a second randomization procedure was used to allocate 
participants to one of the two observation-based learning conditions (NSG-observe, 
SG-observe), with sixteen in each of the four conditions. Participants were tested 
individually and were presented with a fully automated version of Burns and 
Vollmeyer’s (2002) water purification system, which was run on Dell Optiplex 
computers. The experimental program was written in Visual Basic 6.  
2.2. Materials 
The study was based on Burns and Vollmeyer’s water purification system. 
This involved three inputs (Salt, Carbon, Lime) and three outputs (Chlorine 
Concentration, Temperature, Oxygenation). The input-output relations are depicted in 
Figure 1. At the beginning of each trial during the learning phase, and both tests of 
control, the starting values of the inputs were set to 0, and the values of the outputs 
were Chlorine Concentration = 500 units, Temperature = 1000 units, and Oxygenation 
= 100 units.   
 
2.3. Design 
The present study included two types of goal specificity instructions (NSG, 
SG) and two types of learning phase (action, observation), for a total of four 
conditions (NSG-action, SG-action, NSG-observe, SG-observe). Participants were 
presented with a learning phase that was divided into two short blocks, each with 6 
trials. After the end of each block, participants were given a structure test, in which 
they were asked to report what the causal structure of the CDCS was. After this, 
participants were presented with a test phase (Control Test 1, Control Test 2). The 
difference between conditions was in the instructions received (NSG, SG), and in the 
method by which learning took place during the learning phase (action, observation). 
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The effects of this were indexed using a direct measure of knowledge (Structure Test 
1, Structure Test 2) during the learning phase, and an indirect measure of knowledge 
(Control Test 1, Control Test 2) during the control test phase.  
 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be taking part in a problem solving task, 
and that they would be given an opportunity to learn about a water purification system 
during the learning phase of the task. They were also told that their knowledge of the 
system would be examined during the learning phase, and that their ability to apply 
this knowledge would be examined in two tests of control of the system in a later 
presented control test phase. The critical differences between the four conditions 
included in the present study were the learning phase, and the specificity of the 
instructions presented in that phase (for actual instructions used see Appendix).   
 2.4.1. Action-based CDCT version. In the learning phase, participants were 
presented with a computer display (see Figure 3) with three input variables and three 
output variables. The underlying structure that connects the inputs and outputs is 
presented in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
The learning phase comprised 12 trials, which were divided into two blocks of 
6 trials. Each trial consisted of participants changing the value of any number of 
inputs, by using the slider corresponding to each.1 Each slider ranged on a scale from -
100 to 100 units. When participants were satisfied with their changes to the inputs, 
they clicked on a button labeled “output readings,” which revealed the values of all 
three outputs. When they were ready to start the next trial, they clicked a button “next 
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trial,” which hid the output values from view. On the next trial, participants made 
their changes to the inputs, and these affected the output values from the previous 
trial: thus, the effects on the outputs were cumulative from one trial to the next. After 
the first block of 6 trials, participants were presented with a structure test that was 
designed to index knowledge of the causal structure of the control system. A diagram 
of the water system was shown on screen, and participants were asked simply to 
indicate which input was connected to which output (see Figure 2). The direction of 
the input-output connection was implicit in the way that participants interacted with 
the CDCT, and was also indicated in the instructions to the task, and so it was not 
necessary to examine the directionality of the input-output relations, only which 
connections existed. After this, they began the next set of 6 trials, followed by a 
second structure test: at the beginning of the first trial of the second block, the input 
values were set to 0 and the outputs were also reset to their respective starting values.  
The NSG-action condition was given general instructions about the CDCT and 
some guidelines as to how to interact with it (See Appendix). In addition to this, the 
SG-action condition was told that, from the outset, they had to learn about the system 
by trying to achieve, and then maintain, specific output values (i.e., Oxygenation = 
50, Chlorine CL Concentration = 700, Temperature = 900) throughout the two blocks 
of the learning phase.  
2.4.2. Observation-based CDCT version. With the exception that participants 
themselves could not manipulate input values during the learning phase, but were 
instead yoked to the values chosen by a participant (hereafter “model”) from the SG-
action condition, the observation-based and action-based versions of the learning 
phase were identical. Observers began by clicking a button to reveal the input values 
generated by the model for the first trial. (No time limit was imposed on the time 
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spent studying the input values or output values on each trial.) For example, if the 
model changed the input Salt by 50 units on Trial 1, this would in turn change the 
output value of Chlorine Concentration to 556 (i.e., Chlorine Concentration starting 
value = 500 units, + Salt value change = 50 units, + constant added noise on input-
output connection = 6 units). The observer would also see the input Salt change by 50 
units. Then, when they were ready, participants clicked a second button to reveal the 
corresponding output values for that trial: in this case, the starting values of the 
outputs Temperature and Oxygen remained the same, but the corresponding output 
Chlorine Concentration changed to 556 units. As soon as they were ready, participants 
clicked a button to indicate that they were proceeding to the next trial: the button hid 
the output values from view. They Participants then repeated the process of seeing the 
input values, and then the corresponding changes to the output values. As in the 
action-based version, after Trial 6, and after Trial 12, participants were presented with 
a structure test.  
The NSG-observe condition was given general instructions as to which 
features of the system they should attend to when pressing particular buttons. In 
addition, the SG-observe condition was told that, from the outset, they had to assess 
how effective the changes made to the system were in achieving and then maintaining 
specific output values (i.e., Oxygenation = 50, Chlorine CL Concentration = 700, 
Temperature = 900) throughout the 12 trials. The output values that the SG-observe 
condition monitored, and the output values that the SG-action condition had to 
achieve and maintain, were identical.  
 2.4.3. Test Phase (Control Test 1, Control Test 2). After the learning phase, all 
participants completed two tests of control. In Control Test 1, they were required to 
change the input values to achieve and maintain the output values (Oxygen = 50, 
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Chlorine concentration = 700, Temperature = 900) throughout 6 trials. For the NSG 
conditions (NSG-observe, NSG-action), this test was unfamiliar, whereas the SG-
action condition had been performing exactly the same task for 12 trials in their 
version of the learning phase, and the SG-observe condition had been focused on 
assessing how effective the changes made to the system were in achieving and then 
maintaining the same output criteria. In Control Test 2, the output values (i.e., Oxygen 
= 250, Chlorine concentration = 350, Temperature = 1100) that participants had to 
achieve and maintain for 6 trials were unfamiliar to all four conditions. Thus, for the 
SG conditions, but not for the NSG condition, this was the first opportunity to apply 
their knowledge to a different goal to that on which they had been trained.  
2.5. Scoring 
2.5.1. Structure Test scores. The scoring scheme used to score performance on 
Structure Tests 1 and 2 involved computing the proportion of input-output links 
correctly identified for each test. A correction for guessing was incorporated, and was 
based on the same procedure used by Vollmeyer et al. (1996), which was simply 
correct responses (i.e., the number of correct links included, and incorrect links 
avoided) – incorrect responses (i.e., the number of incorrect links included, and 
correct links avoided) / N (the total number of links that could be made). The 
maximum value for each structure score was 1. This scoring scheme was applied to 
score performance on both the structure tests presented during the learning phase.  
2.5.2. Control Test 1 and 2 scores. The scoring procedure used was based on 
Burns and Vollmeyer’s scoring system. Control performance was measured as error 
scores. Error scores were based on calculating the difference between each target 
output value (i.e., the criterion according to the solution phase) and the actual output 
values produced by the participant, for each trial of the Control Test. To minimize the 
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skewedness of the distribution of scores, a log transformation (base 10) was applied to 
the error scores of each individual participant for each trial.  
All analyses of error scores for each control test were based on participants’ 
mean error score, averaged over all 6 trials across all three output variables. Success 
in control performance in both control tests was indexed by the difference between the 
achieved and target output values. Therefore, lower error scores indicate better 
performance.  
2.6. Results 
 This section begins with an analysis of performance on Structure Tests 1 and 2 
(direct measure of knowledge), and then examines participants’ ability to control the 
CDCT in Control Tests 1 and 2 (indirect measure of knowledge). Finally, correlation 
analyses were conducted to examine the potential relationship between indirect and 
direct measures of performance. In all analyses reported in this section, a significance 
criterion of α = .05 was used.  
2.6.1. Structure Test scores. Figure 4 shows that structure test scores increased 
across all conditions after the second block of 6 trials in the learning phase. 
Additionally, the mean structure test scores of the NSG-action and NSG-observe 
conditions were higher than those of the SG-action and SG-observe condition, 
indicating that the NSG conditions’ knowledge of the causal structure of the system 
tended to be more accurate than that of SG conditions. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
A 2x2x2 ANOVA was conducted using block (Structure Test 1, Structure Test 2) as 
the within-subjects variable, and goal type (NSG, SG) and learning phase (action, 
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observation) as the between-subjects variables. The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of block, F(1, 60) = 14.04, MSE = .71, p< .0005, and of goal type F(1, 60) 
= 11.73, MSE = 1.37, p< .001. There was no main effect of learning phase, F(1, 60) = 
.59, MSE = .07, p = .45, and no interactions were significant. Thus, the evidence 
confirms the trends suggested in Figure 4: there was increased accuracy in knowledge 
of the causal structure in the second block. The evidence also indicates that 
differences between conditions in performance on structure tests were the result of the 
specificity of the instruction presented to participants, and not of the learning phase.  
2.6.2. Control Test 1 and 2 scores. Figure 5 includes the overall mean Control 
Test 1 and 2 scores for each condition.  
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Figure 5 shows that the NSG-action and NSG-observe conditions made fewer errors 
in Control Tests 1 and 2 than the SG-action and SG-observe conditions. In addition, 
Figure 5 suggests that participants made more errors in Control Test 2 than in Control 
Test 1. To analyze this, a 2x2x2 ANOVA was conducted, to examine the patterns of 
behavior across conditions for Control Test 1 and 2 scores, using test (Control Test 1, 
Control Test 2) as the within-subjects variable, and goal type (NSG, SG) and learning 
phase (action, observation) as the between-subjects variables. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of test, F(1, 60) = 13.55, p< .0005, and of goal type  F(1, 60) = 
40.33, p< .0005. However, there was no main effect of learning phase, F(1, 60) = .22, 
p = .64, nor were any of the interactions significant. Thus, the evidence confirms the 
trends suggested in Figure 5: control performance in Control Test 1 was superior to 
that in Control Test 2. The evidence also indicates that the difference between 
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conditions in control performance was the result of the specificity of the instruction, 
and not of the learning phase.  
2.6.3. Correlation between Structure Test scores and Control Test scores. 
Berry and Broadbent (1987, 1988) have argued that dissociation between performance 
on direct and indirect measures of knowledge of CDCS suggests that the knowledge 
gained in control tasks is procedural. The basis for this is that individuals show good 
control of the system, but fail to express their knowledge when asked explicitly to 
report on the structure or the underlying rule that connects inputs to outputs (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Buchner et al., 1995; Lee, 1995). To examine this, a 
correlation analysis between Structure Tests 1 and 2 scores and Control Tests 1 and 2 
scores was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant negative relationship 
between Structure Test 2 and Control Test 1, r(64) = -0.49, p < 0.005, and between 
Structure Test 2 and Control Test 2, r(64) = -0.53, p < 0.001. This suggests that, as 
performance on Structure Test 2 increased, ability to control the system also 
increased, as indicated by lower control test scores. To fully explore the distinction 
between declarative and procedural knowledge, the same correlation analyses were 
conducted separately for the observation-based learning conditions (SG-observe, 
NSG-observe), and for the action-based learning conditions (SG-action, NSG-action). 
Focusing only on procedural-based conditions, the analysis revealed a significant 
negative relationship between Structure Test 2 and Control Test 1, r(32) = -0.61, p < 
0.0005, and between Structure Test 2 and Control Test 2, r(32) = -0.46, p < 0.01. In 
the case of observation-based condition, the analysis revealed a significant negative 
relationship between Structure Test 2 and Control Test 1, r(32) = -0.36, p < 0.05, and 
between Structure Test 2 and Control Test 2, r(32) = -0.60, p < 0.001. The findings 
from these sets of analyses strongly indicate that, for both types of learning phases 
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(observation-based, procedural-based), there is a relationship between indirect and 
direct measures of knowledge.  
 
3. Discussion 
The evidence from the present study can be summarized as follows: First, the 
study successfully replicated Burns and Vollmeyer’s findings, which showed that goal 
specificity affects the accuracy of performance in a CDCT. Second, consistent with 
Burns and Vollmeyer’s study, the goal specificity effect was located in both indices of 
knowledge of the control system (i.e., Structure Test scores, Control Test scores). 
Third, there was evidence of practice effects in the structure test scores, suggesting 
that, from Block 1 to Block 2, greater familiarity with the task environment in the 
learning phase led to increased knowledge of the causal structure of the system. This 
is consistent with the findings reported in Burns and Vollmeyer’s (2002) study. 
However, there was poorer performance in Control Test 2 than in Control Test 1, 
suggesting that participants found the criteria of the second control test more difficult 
to reach and maintain than the first.  
Fourth, in the present study the performance of both NSG conditions was superior 
to the SG conditions in Control Test 1 and 2. This is particularly noteworthy given 
that the SG conditions had 12 trials of prior experience in evaluating the system to the 
same criterion as in Control Test 1, while the NSG conditions had not. However in 
previous studies that used similar simulated systems to the present study (Burns & 
Vollmeyer, 2002; Vollmeyer et al. 1996) the control performance of NSG and SG 
conditions in Control Test 1 was equivalent, and only in Control Test 2 did NSG 
conditions show superior performance. The procedures used in the learning phase 
differed slightly between the present study and Burns and Vollmeyer’s study (2002) 
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(see footnote) which provides an explanation for the difference in findings. In the 
present study, the added effort required in accurately recalling the values of all the 
inputs and outputs imposed on any available resources SG condition had that would 
have otherwise been used to learn the relationship between the inputs and outputs. For 
the NSG conditions paying close attention to the input and output values and 
remembering them for the next trial favoured their method of learning. Through 
hypothesis testing they had to accurately monitor the consequences of their 
own/observed manipulations to the system, thus strengthening their knowledge of the 
system. Therefore, despite the extra experience that SG conditions had in evaluating 
the system to a criterion did not lead to the same results reported in previous studies 
because the extra working memory load made learning about the system that much 
harder than the NSG conditions.  
Fifth, there was evidence that participants’ knowledge of the structure of the 
system was related to their ability to control the system in both Control Test 1 and 
Control Test 2. Moreover, this relationship was found in conditions in which learning 
was observation-based as well as in conditions in which learning was action-based. 
This result challenges the widely held popular view (e.g., Berry, 1991; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1988; Lee, 1995; Lee & Vakoch, 1996; Stanley et al., 1989; Sun et al., 
2001) that CDCTs promote proceduralized knowledge that is inaccessible to 
consciousness, and is therefore independent of declarative knowledge of the CDCS. 
Finally, the present study provides evidence that hypothesis testing, rather than 
procedural processes, is a necessary component in the acquisition of knowledge in 
CDCTs, and that SG learning produces inferior problem solving performance to NSG 
learning. Thus, the findings indicate that observation-based problem solving is 
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sensitive to goal specificity effects, and can be as effective as procedural-based 
problem solving. 
The present study provides evidence that declarative and procedural 
knowledge were associated, and that procedural learning per se is not a necessary 
condition for the acquisition of knowledge in a CDCT. In addition, the evidence 
showed that differences in performance between action and observation-based 
learning conditions were the result of goal specificity instructions, and not of how 
problem solvers interacted with the CDCT during learning. Taken together, the 
findings from the present study raise the following questions: Why is there a 
discrepancy between the present findings and previous studies of CDCTs that show 
dissociation between procedural and declarative knowledge? Should action be 
awarded a special status in learning and problem solving? The following discussion 
will examine issues related to addressing these questions.  
 
3.1. Dissociations and Associations between Procedural and Declarative Knowledge  
Funke’s (2001) recent review suggests that studies of CDCTs have followed 
two separate research histories: one has focused on decision making by experts within 
their domain of expertise (e.g., Dörner, 1996; Klein, 1990; Lipshitz, 1993; Lipshitz et 
al., 2001; Randel, Pugh, & Reed, 1996), whereas the other examines the development 
of expertise in novices (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987, 1988; Burns & 
Vollmeyer, 2002; Sweller, 1998; Vollmeyer et al., 1996). One of the many differences 
found between experts and novices is that, for experts, their declarative knowledge 
and procedural knowledge are associated (Anderson, 1983; Funke, 2001; Glaser & 
Bassok, 1989), whereas for novices there is dissociation. The reasons for this are that 
experts’ knowledge is closely tied to their conceptions of the goal structures of a 
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problem space (Glaser & Bassok, 1989), and their ability to organize specific 
instances of the CDCS (i.e., input-output states of the system), by chunking them into 
cause-effect sequences that relate goals to sub-goals (Sweller, 1988). Thus, one reason 
proposed for the dissociation between declarative and procedural knowledge reported 
in novices is that they do not acquire sufficient experience for an association to occur 
(e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986; 
Glaser, 1976; Randel et al., 1996; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995).  
Increasing experience with CDCSs, to enhance the relationship between 
novices’ declarative and procedural knowledge, has been unsuccessful (e.g., Berry & 
Broadbent, 1987, 1988; Broadbent et al., 1986; Sanderson, 1989). However, 
Sanderson’s (1989) careful manipulations uncovered conditions that revealed 
dissociations between declarative and procedural knowledge (i.e., increased practice, 
graphical representations of the CDCS), but also revealed associations (i.e., removal 
of problem solver’s trial history—a record of input-output changes on each trial 
during learning). The exclusion of a trial history during learning was inspired by 
Berry & Broadbent’s (1984) finding that, when problem solvers gave verbal protocols 
during learning, as a way of tracking the input-output changes in the system and their 
hypothesis testing behavior, associations between declarative and procedural 
knowledge were found. Sanderson proposed that, without a record of their interactions 
with the system, problem solvers would engage in processes that were similar to those 
used in providing verbal protocols. Consistent with Berry and Broadbent’s finding, 
Sanderson showed that, by mentally tracking their hypothesis testing strategies, 
problem solvers continually updated their knowledge of the input-output relations of 
the CDCT, and this led to an association between declarative knowledge and 
procedural knowledge. However, Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) presented their 
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participants a trial history of their learning phase and found an association between 
measures of declarative and procedural knowledge. The evidence from the protocols 
they recorded suggested that the tests of declarative knowledge included after the first 
and second block of the learning phase served as status checks. Participants examined 
their knowledge of the system after the first test after the first block of learning and 
used the remainder of the learning phase to modify this knowledge. Including tests of 
declarative knowledge during learning may have facilitated an association between 
declarative and procedural knowledge because, like Sanderson’s study, participants 
were able to keep track of their knowledge of the system in order to learn to control it 
during learning.  
Similarly, in the present study problem solvers were presented with tests of 
their structural knowledge during learning, and were not presented with their trial 
history during the learning phase. Both these procedures may have contributed to the 
relationship that was found between indirect (i.e. procedural) and direct (i.e. 
declarative) measures of knowledge of the system. Moreover, the exclusion of a trial 
history, along with the inclusion of measure of declarative knowledge during learning 
may have also have contributed to the similar patterns in performance found in 
observation-based and action-based learning conditions. Without a trial history, both 
observation-based and action-based conditions had to keep active in memory the 
input-output changes from trial to trial, and they had to monitor carefully which inputs 
they were attending to, and their prediction of which outputs would be affected, and 
then compare this with the outputs that were actually affected. As Burns and 
Vollmeyer show, compared to NSG instructions, attenuating hypothesis testing 
through SG instructions is detrimental to problem solving. Thus, in the present study, 
the instruction presented to SG conditions interrupted hypothesis testing behavior 
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during the learning phase, because participants’ attention was focused only on 
recalling specific input-output instances that were relevant to the SG they had to reach 
and maintain (e.g., Buchner et al., 1995; Dienes & Fahey, 1998).  
By extension, one reason for the evidence of poorer performance by 
observation based learners, compared to procedural based learners in CDCTs (Berry, 
1991; Lee, 1995), is the inclusion of trial histories during learning along with the 
presentation of SG type instructions (Berry, 1991; Lee, 1995). For example, in 
Berry’s (1991) observation-based problem, solvers were actively discouraged from 
hypothesis testing: “Subjects should be encouraged to pay attention to the observed 
interaction but not be induced to use a more deliberate hypothesis testing mode of 
performance” (Berry, 1991, p. 885). Similarly, in Lee’s observation-based learners 
were required to learn a rule passively without undertaking any evaluative thinking. 
Berry’s and Lee’s active discouragement of hypothesis testing was designed to 
increase control performance in later tests of problem solving ability, because 
hypothesis testing involves explicit monitoring and tracking of representations that 
interfere with procedural processes that are implicit (Berry & Broadbent, 1987). In 
this way, Berry’s and Lee’s instruction to avoid hypothesis testing functioned like an 
SG instruction and, in a similar way, produced poorer control performance than 
procedural-based learners who were not given an explicit instruction to avoid 
hypothesis testing.  
The implication of studies showing associations between declarative and 
procedural knowledge (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; 
Sanderson, 1989; Sanderson & Vicente, 1986), along with the present study, is that 
mentally tracking or verbalizing one’s hypothesis testing behavior is important in 
bridging declarative and procedural knowledge. Underlying these two activities is 
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self-monitoring (Bandura, 1991), which has been shown to be critical in the 
acquisition of expertise (Bandura, 1991; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Ericsson & 
Lehman, 1996; Karoly, 1993; Rossano, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). In a given problem, 
selecting relevant information that bears on achieving a goal cannot happen without 
an internal status check of ongoing problem solving performance (Bandura, 1991; 
Bandura & Locke, 2003; Karoly, 1993; Rossano, 2003). Once experts are sufficiently 
practiced in a task, self-monitoring is no longer needed to regulate goal relevant 
information, (Karoly, 1993); but it remains active in order to modify behavior to meet 
potentially new task demands (Rossano, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). In studies of 
CDCTs, findings show that experts’ declarative and procedural knowledge is 
associated (e.g., Funke, 2001), and that self-monitoring is necessary in the acquisition 
of expertise (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Schraw, 1998). When novices are encouraged to 
adopt behaviors that are akin to self-monitoring, associations between declarative and 
procedural knowledge are also found (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Sanderson, 1989; 
Sanderson & Vicente, 1986). Thus, self-monitoring of one’s behavior, its 
determinants, and its effects is, for experts, an essential method of acquiring, 
organizing, and applying different types of knowledge in problem solving domains 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura & Locke, 2003; Funke, 2001; Schraw, 1998).  
 
3.2. Should Action be Awarded a Special Status in Learning and Problem Solving? 
 The role of action has been strongly emphasized, not only in learning and 
problem solving research, but also in education and instructional psychology (i.e., the 
methods and conditions under which instruction facilitates human learning and 
development). The Constructivism tradition (Anderson, 1987; Resnick, 1983, 1987; 
Schauble, 1990; von Glasersfeld, 1989) asserts that action plays a crucial role for 
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learners in constructing their own knowledge. In an educational context, active 
engagement entails students examining their own ideas, considering alternative 
explanations for newly taught concepts, and evaluating competing perspectives. Some 
theorists (e.g., Anzai & Simon, 1979) propose that these processes are found when 
learning is by doing. However, a constructivist perspective essentially points to the 
need for instructional formats that allow for self-monitoring (e.g., Covington, 2000; 
Pintrich & De Groot, 1990), which includes reflective activities such as describing, 
explaining, and evaluative thinking (e.g., Covington, 2000; Zimmerman, 1990), and 
these need not occur through action.  
Another example in which the superior status of action over observation is 
emphasized is the intention-superiority effect (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). This refers to 
the phenomenon in which items related to activities about to be completed are recalled 
faster and more accurately than observed activities (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). It has since 
been shown that memory of intended actions is not only superior to that of observed 
actions, but also of completed actions (Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Maylor, Chater, & 
Brown, 2001; Maylor, Darby, & Della Sala, 2000). Moreover, there is evidence that the 
effect is dependent on personality variables (i.e., action-dependent vs. state-dependent 
dispositions) that influence self-regulation and self-monitoring (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994; Kuhl & Goschke, 1994; Penningroth, 2005). Penningroth 
(2005) showed that, for action-orientated participants who show a tendency to reflectivity, 
retrieval was more proficient for intended acts than for acts that had taken place, whereas 
there was a reversal of this effect in action-orientated participants who show a tendency to 
be instinctive, spontaneous, and unreflective.  
The special status that action has been awarded over observation has been 
proposed in learning (e.g., Berry, 1991; Kelly & Burton, 2001; Lee, 1995), memory 
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(e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), problem solving (e.g., Berry, 1991; Lee, 1995), 
education (e.g., Anzai & Simon, 1979; Resnick 1983, 1987). This is particularly 
because observation is characterized as passive and uninvolved. However, as studies 
of CDCTs (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Burns & Vollmeyer, 2002; Sanderson, 
1989) and the present study suggest, the level of involvement of self-monitoring 
during learning may be a critical factor in preserving the distinction between action-
based and observation-based learning in problem solving environments.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The evidence convincingly replicated the goal specificity effect, and 
demonstrated that this effect generalized to an observation-based learning mode of 
problem solving. Moreover, the evidence from this study shows that observational 
learning can promote successful and accurate problem solving in a dynamic control 
task, and that it is sensitive to goal specificity effects in the same way as action-based 
problem solving. Finally, the evidence suggests that it is hypothesis testing, rather 
than the procedural element of control tasks, that is necessary for the successful 
uptake of knowledge, and its practical application in mastering a complex system.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. In Burns and Vollmeyer’s study, participants were shown the starting values 
of input and output values before they began the task. They were also 
presented with their own trial history; this included the inputs and outputs that 
changed on each trial. In the present experiment, participants were shown only 
the starting values of the input values, and not the output values, which were 
revealed only on the first trial, and not before. In addition, they were not 
presented with a trial history that they could refer to during the learning phase. 
The rationale for these changes was to encourage participants to pay special 
attention to, and accurately monitor and recall the effects on the outputs 
resulting from the manipulations that were made to the system.   
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Figure Captions. 
 
Figure 1. Water tank system with inputs (salt, carbon, lime) and outputs (oxygenation, 
chlorine concentration, temperature).  
Figure 2. Structure test. 
Figure 3. Screen shot of water tank system. 
Figure 4. Mean Structure Test scores (±SE) after each block of the learning phase for 
each condition; the lower the score, the better the performance. 
Figure 5. Control Test scores (±SE) at Control Test 1 and Control Test 2 for each 
condition; the higher the score, the better the performance. 
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Figure 1. 
Water tank system with inputs (salt, carbon, lime) and outputs (oxygenation, chlorine 
concentration, temperature). 
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Figure 2. 
Structure test. 
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Figure 3 
Screen shot of water tank system  
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Figure 4  
Mean Structure Test scores (±SE) after each block of the learning phase for each 
condition 
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Figure 5 
Control Test scores (±SE) at Control Test 1 and Control Test 2 for each condition 
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Appendix 
 
Standard action instructions: 
You are a trainee laboratory technician working in a water filtration unit. As part of 
your training you will learn to control the water tank system by managing three water 
quality measures: Oxygenation; Chlorine CL concentration; Temperature. The quality  
measures are known as outputs and are used to monitor three system inputs: Salt; 
Carbon; Lime. In the following task you will be presented a total of 12 trials in which 
you will see a diagram of the 'Malwart' water filtration unit which you will learn to 
control. You can modify the quality measures by manipulating the amount of Salt, 
Carbon, or Lime inputs; this can be done by moving the slider corresponding to the 
input either to the left or to the right. 
 
NSG-action condition also received:  
For each trial you should try to change one input, however this is only a 
recommendation and you may choose to use a different strategy. Once you have 
changed the value of an input you can then check the output levels by pressing the 
button labeled 'show me readings'; this will reveal the concentration levels of the 
quality measures. After you have studied these you should press the 'restart' button to 
begin the next trial. You should try and pay close attention to the values of the inputs 
you enter into the system and the output levels because this will help you to learn 
about the system. Good Luck! 
 
SG-action condition also received:  
For each trial you should try to change one input, but this is only a recommendation 
and you may chose to use a different strategy. Once you have done this you can check 
the output levels by pressing the button labelled 'show me readings'; this will reveal 
the concentration levels of the quality measures. After you have studied these you 
should press the 'restart' button to begin the next trial. Your task will be to change the 
output levels so that Oxygenation = 50, Chlorine CL Concentration = 700, 
Temperature = 900. Try to get as close to these levels as possible, and once you have 
done this try to maintain these levels throughout. Good Luck! 
 
Standard observation instructions: 
You are a trainee laboratory technician working in a water filtration unit. As part of 
your training you will learn to control the water tank system by managing three water 
quality measures: Oxygenation; Chlorine CL concentration; Temperature. The quality 
measures are known as outputs and are used to monitor three system inputs: Salt; 
Carbon; Lime.                                
In the following task you will be presented with a series of trials in which you will see 
a diagram of the 'Malwart' water filtration unit which you will learn to control. The 
system is set so that the quality measures change according to the values chosen by 
one of the workers of the water plant. You will see the amount of Salt, Carbon, and 
Lime inputs change automatically according to those set by the worker, this is 
indicated by a slider corresponding to each input moving either to the left or the right. 
You will see a total of 12 trials divided into two short sessions of 6 each.  
 
NSG-observe condition also received:  
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For each trial you should watch carefully the changes to the inputs. When you have 
examined the changes to the inputs you can check the output levels by pressing the 
button labeled 'Output readings'. This will reveal the concentration levels of the 
quality measures. After you have studied these you should press the 'Input levels' 
button to begin the next trial. You should try and pay close attention to the values of 
the inputs that are entered and the output levels, this is because you will be required to 
imitate the worker's behavior later. Good Luck! 
 
SG-observe condition also received:  
For each trial you should try to change one input, but this is only a recommendation 
and you may chose to use a different strategy. Once you have done this you can check 
the output levels by pressing the button labeled 'show me readings'; this will reveal the 
concentration levels of the quality measures. After you have studied these you should 
press the 'restart' button to begin the next trial. Your task will be to change the output 
levels so that Oxygenation = 50, Chlorine CL Concentration = 700, Temperature = 
900. Try to get as close to these levels as possible, and once you have done this try to 
maintain these levels throughout. Good Luck! 
 
 
